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Abstract
Switzerland, as many developed countries, face a double problem for the next round
of international negotiations on climate change. On the one hand, short term eco-
nomic strategies would favor the implementation of a global carbon market that would
minimize abatement costs globally. On the other hand, purchasing emissions certifi-
cates from developing countries does not prepare for the major technological and social
changes that will certainly be required before the end of the century to avoid climate
change. In this paper we use a coupled top-down bottom-up model to assess the im-
pacts of a number of ambitious climate policies in Switzerland. We find that stringent
policies with both domestic and total emission targets are affordable for a wealthy
country like Switzerland. Such policies could not only put Switzerland in a leading po-
sition regarding climate change issues but also pave the way for its long term climate
policies.
Keywords: Switzerland, Climate policy, Climate neutrality, Coupled CGE, Wel-
fare economics
JEL Codes: C68, Q56, F18
1 Introduction
Currently there is an important discussion about what will be the shape of the international
climate policies that will be enacted after 2012. Among the important issues being discussed,
countries will have to decide upon the level of abatement they can achieve and to what extent
to allow the use of flexibility mechanisms like global GHG emissions certificates markets. The
decision to commit to a emission reduction target and to use or not flexibility mechanisms
depends mainly on the expected welfare costs of the policie and on the short and long terms
environmental objectives of the country. In this paper, we analyze four ambitious emission
targets for Switzerland.
∗This work has been undertaken with the support of the NSF-NCCR climate grant. We also would like
to thank Philippe Thalmann, Hal Turton and Thomas Rutherford for their helpful comments as well as
Laurent Drouet for his continuous support.
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First we consider an abatement of 50% by 2050 with respect to 2000 emissions level; a
reference target for developed countries since it has been extensively discuss in the European
Union.
Secondly, a sustainable approach that reflects the fact that the ultimate goal of post-
Kyoto climate policies will be to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at sustainable
levels. Recent international studies (IPCC, 2007) state that concentrations of 450ppm would
limit the increase of temperature to acceptable levels (around 2◦C) and, therefore, could be
considered as sustainable. In order to limit the concentrations to those levels and taking into
account the approach of contraction and convergence policies (ETHZ, 2008; Meyer, 2000),
GHG emissions per capita would have to be globally limited to 1 tCO2eq per annum by
2100. For developed countries, such a target is far from current levels of emissions per capita
(7.2 tCO2eq/cap in Switzerland in 2004), and for developing countries, it means that their
development could not be based on the technologies that contributed to the development of
industrialized countries.
Thirdly, the neutral approach advocates the offset of the totality of the emissions gen-
erated by a person, a company or a country. This idea is increasingly accepted among
individuals and companies, however, it would represent a major step forward to extend the
idea to a whole country. In the framework of the revision of its Swiss CO2 tax, Switzerland
has already mentioned the climate neutrality as a potential option for the future of Swiss
climate policy (FOE, 2008). This neutrality could be mainly achieved by means of large
purchases of CO2 certificates, potentially jeopardizing the efforts to further improve the
energy efficiency of Swiss infrastructures and technologies as well as change toward more
sustainable behaviors of consumers and firms.
Fourthly, the zero-footprint approach which includes offsetting emissions embodied in
imported goods. Supporters of a “neutral” Switzerland state that the transfers generated
by the purchase of certificates will allow developing countries to achieve a more sustainable
development path, in particular when considering that developing countries are producing
an important share of high energy goods. In Switzerland, the share of embodied emissions in
the Swiss net trade represents about 80% of the domestic emissions (Jungbluth et al., 2007).
Going one step further and taking embodied emissions into account for setting emissions
targets could revolutionizes the current approach to international climate negotiations, since,
so far, the GHG emitted to produce goods are accounted in the producing countries, not in
the consuming ones.
Moreover, regardless of how ambitious the Swiss emission target will be, if the abatement
is manly achieved through the purchase of GHG emissions certificates and that the global
price of he certificates is low, the country might not start the necessary upgrading of its
infrastructures or see changes in the consumption patterns. Without a minimal domestic
abatement, the four approaches above may sound like a solution which could only bring
economic benefits in the short term. With that in mind, we also analyze policies that follow
the same approaches but includes the additional requirement to have a 50% reduction of
domestic emissions.
The objective of this paper is to assess the economic consequences of such polices on the
Swiss economy, considering as illustrative example the residential sector. In order achieve
the various objectives above, we combine the implementation of a linearly progressive Swiss
GHG emissions tax with a global GHG emissions certificates market. In view of the size
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of Switzerland, the price of the certificates is mainly seen as being influenced solely by the
emissions targets decided by in other regions. Therefore, we have considered tree different
international scenarios. In each of them, the Swiss tax is either used to achieve a domestic
abatement or to collect the revenue that would allow for the purchase of foreign GHG
emissions certificates.
We use a coupled top-down bottom-up model that allows for a precise technological
specifications in the Swiss residential sector, which encompasses a great potential for GHG
emissions abatement, without loosing the national and global economic picture. The cou-
pling between top-down and bottom-up models has already been explored in the literature
(see, among other, Bo¨hringer (1998); Drouet et al. (2005); Lo¨schel and Soria (2007); Manne
and Richels (1992); Pizer et al. (2003); Sceia et al. (2008); Scha¨fer and Jacoby (2006); Wing
(2006). We have nevertheless followed an approach relatively different from those used by
these authors. In Pizer et al. (2003), Scha¨fer and Jacoby (2006) and Lo¨schel and Soria
(2007) the coupling has been mainly carried out in the calibration phase of the modeling;
bottom-up models were used to calibrate some of the parameters in the top-down models.
Different from them, we have linked the models in the simulation phase. In Bo¨hringer (1998)
and Wing (2006), technology details have been directly incorporated in a CGE model. In
contrast, we have worked with existing bottom-up and top-down models and tried to keep
them as close as possible from their original formulation. Therefore, both models have been
kept separate, while linking them with a coupling module. Manne and Richels (1992) in-
corporated a reduced CGE model in a bottom-up model. In contrast, we tried to keep our
CGE as complete as possible, allowing for a more complete and realistic interpretation of
the results for the forthcoming consultation procedure on the future of the Swiss CO2 law.
Finally, until now, the only coupling papers specifically targeted to the Swiss residential
sector are Drouet et al. (2005) and Sceia et al. (2008). Drouet et al. (2005) have devised an
hybrid model where the residential sector is completely removed from the top-down model
and it is replaced by an exogenous and separate bottom-up model. Sceia et al. (2008) devel-
oped the earlier version of the model we use in this paper. We brought various improvement
to the coupling procedure, the models as well as the calibration procedure.
We find that if international agreements aim at limited emission reductions, Switzerland
could afford very stringent abatement targets without substantial welfare losses. In the
case where developing countries would start contributing significantly to the abatement
effort, even as late as in 2030, the impact of highly stringent policies becomes important,
but getting on the track of sustainability could be affordable with a progressive GHG tax
reaching around 140 USD2001/tCO2eq.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the models and the methodology,
section 3 presents the policy scenarios, section 4 the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Models and methodology
2.1 GEMINI-E3
We use an aggregated version of GEMINI-E3, a dynamic-recursive CGE model with a highly
detailed representation of indirect taxation, that represents the world economy in 6 regions
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and 18 sectors1. We defined the regions as follows: Switzerland (CHE), European Union
(EUR)2, other European and Euro-asian countries (OEU)3, Japan (JAP), USA, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand (OEC) and other countries, mainly developing countries (DCS).
The model is formulated as a Mixed Complementarity Problem , which is solved using
GAMS and the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000; Ferris and Pang, 1997). GEMINI-
E3 is built on a comprehensive energy-economy data set, the GTAP-6 database (Dimaranan,
2007), that provides a consistent representation of energy markets in physical units and a
detailed Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for a large set of countries or regions and bilat-
eral trade flows between them. Moreover, we have completed the data from the GTAP
database with information on indirect taxation, energy balances and government expendi-
tures from the International Energy Agency (International Energy Agency, 2002a,b, 2005),
the OECD (OECD, 2005, 2003) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2004). For
Switzerland, we used data from 2001 input-output table devised at the Swiss Federal In-
stitute of Technology (ETH) in Zu¨rich (Nathani et al., 2006) which we transformed in the
GEMINI-E3 format (Sceia et al., 2007). All the data on emissions and abatement costs
for non CO2 GHG come from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 2006).
Previouly, GEMINI-E3 has been used to study the strategic allocation of GHG emission
allowances in the enlarge EU market (Viguier et al., 2006), analyze the behavior of Russia
with regard to the ratification process of the Kyoto Protocol (Bernard et al., 2003), assess the
cost of implementation of the Kyoto protocol in Switzerland with and without international
emissions trading (Bernard et al., 2005), or assess the effects of an increase of oil prices on
global and GHG emissions (Vielle and Viguier, 2007).
Apart from a comprehensive description of indirect taxation, the specificity of the model
is that it simulates all relevant markets: commodities (through relative prices), labor (through
wages) as well as domestic and international savings (through rates of interest and exchange
rates). Terms of trade (i.e. transfers of real income between countries resulting from vari-
ations of relative prices of imports and exports) and “real” exchange rates can also be
accurately modeled. GEMINI-E3 also calculates the deadweight loss for each region on the
basis of the consumers’ surplus and the gains or losses from the terms of trade.
Time periods are linked in the model through endogenous real interest rates, which are
determined by the equilibrium between savings and investments. National and regional
models are linked by endogenous real exchange rates resulting from constraints on foreign
trade deficits or surpluses.
In order to allow the calibration and the coupling of GEMINI-E3 with MARKAL-
CHRES, we have replaced the Stone-Geary utility function by a nested constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) function. The nesting structure is shown in Figure 1. Numbers in
the figure refer to the products as presented in appendix B table 5. The σx refer to the
elasticity parameter of each node. The version of GEMINI-E3 we use for this research only
uses petroleum products as input in the transportation energy nest.
1The complete GEMINI-E3 represents the world economy in 28 regions (including Switzerland) and 18
sectors (see table 5 in appendix B for the detailed classification). All information about the model can be
found at http://www.gemini-e3.net, including its complete description (Bernard and Vielle, 2008).
2refers to the European Union member states as of 2008
3includes other European countries, Russia and the rest of the Former Soviet Union excluding Baltic
states
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Figure 1: Structure of the households’ nested CES utility function
We have also introduced an emission certificates market that allows for modeling a global
cap and trade system. Each region receives annually an endowment of emission certificates,
equal to the emission policy target. In Switzerland, we have also implemented an exogenous
progressive GHG tax, independent from the global price of certificates that allows for higher
domestic abatement.
2.1.1 Measuring the cost of GHG abatement
Climate policies are devised in order to avoid future welfare losses induced by the potentially
costly damages and adaptation measures entailed by changes in climate if no mitigation effort
is undertaken. It is not the aim in this paper to consider the tradeoff between adaptation and
mitigation measures but rather to measure the costs for the society to abate GHG emission.
Measuring the costs of climate policies and comparing their efficiencies can be done in various
way. A simple approach consists in analyzing de variation of macroeconomic aggregates such
as GDP or households’ final consumption (HFC). Unfortunately, the variation of GDP and
HFC does not account for the variation of relative prices induced by the introduction of a
GHG tax. The households’ surplus, either based on the compensative variation of income
(CVI) or the equivalent variation of income is a more consistent and complete measure of
the costs of climate policies (Bernard and Vielle, 2003). The households’ surplus or total
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welfare gains (WGt) at each period t can therefore be expressed as
WGt = ∆Rt − CV It, (1)
where ∆R is the variation of income, mainly due to transfers trough international trade.
The welfare gains vary greatly from the theoretical case of a close economy, where they are
equal to the deadweight loss of taxation (DWL), to the case of an open economy having
access to an emissions certificates trading market. In this later case, the total welfare gains
can be expressed as
WGt = DWLt +GTTt + ECt, (2)
where GTT and EC are respectively the gains or losses of the terms of trade and the
net revenue from trading emission certificates. Assuming that trade balances are indeed
balanced at each period and for each region, the GTT can be calculated as follow,
GTT =
∑
i
(X0i,t ·∆P
X
i,t −M
0
i,t ·∆P
M
i,t ), (3)
where, for sector i and period t, X0i,t is the baseline exports, M
0
i,t the baseline imports,
∆PXi,t the export price variation between the baseline and the scenario and ∆P
M
i,t the import
price variation. The sum of GTT and EC over all regions equal zero, since the global
economy may be thought as a close economy. As a consequence, the world consumer surplus
equals the world deadweight loss of taxation.
In order to present the total effect on the welfare of a specific scenario, we represents the
sum of the various discounted values as a percentage of the sum of the discounted households
final consumption, using a 5% discount rate.
2.2 MARKAL-CHRES
MARKAL models are perfect-foresight bottom-up energy-systems models that provide a
detailed representation of energy supply and end-use technologies under a set of assumptions
about demand projections, technology data specifications and resource potential (Loulou
et al., 2004). The backbone of the MARKAL modelling approach is the so-called Reference
Energy System (RES). The RES represents currently available and possible future energy
technologies and energy carriers. From the RES, the optimization model chooses the least-
cost combination of energy technologies and flows for a given time horizon and given end-use
energy demands.
The MARKAL-CHRES is an energy model describing the Swiss residential energy sys-
tem. It is based on the Swiss MARKAL model developed at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI)
and previously used to analyze the Swiss 2000 Watt Society concept (Schulz et al., 2008),
among others. MARKAL-CHRES comprises only a part of the complete Swiss model, being
restricted to technologies related to the residential sector and treating final energy as being
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imported with exogenous prices. The model still contains 173 technologies using different
energy sources (coal, oil, gas, electricity, wood, pellets and district heat). Resource costs
and potentials as well as technology costs, potentials and characteristics vary over time.
Base year (2000) energy demand in MARKAL-CHRES is calibrated to International En-
ergy Agency (IEA) and Swiss statistics. The model has a time horizon of 50 years until 2050,
divided into eleven time steps each with a duration of five years (except the base year). The
residential energy sector of the model includes 14 energy demand segments (see appendix B
table 6). The most important segments are the Room-Heating (RH) segments which repre-
sent more than 70% of final energy demand. We distinguish four different demand categories
for RH: Single and Multi Family Houses as well as existing and new buildings. In the model
we assume that dwellings constructed after the year 2000 are new buildings. The model
uses USD2000 as currency, and a 5% discount rate. One of the specific features of the
MARKAL-CHRES model is that it includes a representation of a set of technologies which
allow for energy savings. The idea behind those technologies is to take into account the
reduction of energy demand which follows certain types of investment. For example, in-
stalling double-glazed windows increases insulation and therefore reduces heating demand.
For a more detailed description of the technologies used in the MARKAL-CHRES model,
see Schulz (2007).
2.3 Baseline calibration
Both models are calibrated to produce a common baseline. In GEMINI-E3, we use the
projections from Energy Information Administration (2008) to estimate future prices for
oil up to 2030 (70.5 USD2006/bbl) and assume a constant increase of 2% up to 2050 so
that oil price reaches 109.6 USD2006/bbl. Based on various studies (Awerbuch and Sauter,
2006; Siliverstovs et al., 2005), we assume an indexation of gas prices to the price of oil at
0.75 (i.e. the price of gas increases by 7.5% when the oil price increases by 10%). For the
MARKAL-CHRES model, we aligne the variation of energy prices, using the growth rates of
energy prices in GEMINI-E3. Furthermore, population and economic estimates (e.g. GDP)
together with construction estimations are used in order to estimate the Reference Energy
Area (REA), i.e. the total useful surface of all heated rooms. The heating demands or
useful energy used for heating (TJ/year) is equal to the Specific Room Heating Demand
(MJ/m2year) multiplied by REA (Mio m2).The Swiss Federal Office of Energy provides
estimates of the REA until 2035. Values until 2050 are extrapolated. Assuming a constant
per capita energy demand for all other demand segments, we define them using the growth
rate of the Swiss population. The Swiss population is expected to grow until 2030 at a level
of approximately 7.4 million people and then slowly decrease to reach 7.25 in 2050. Finally,
according to the projections by State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (2004), the annual
average GDP growth rate is expected to be 1.2% from 2001 to 2020, and 0.6% from 2020 to
2050.
We use the baseline fuel mix from MARKAL-CHRES in GEMINI-E3 in order to align
the emissions in the residential sector between the two models. The shares between the
different energies are set to the shares of the fuel mix. Moreover, we define the technical
progress in the residential energy nest so that the variations of the total residential energy
use in GEMINI-E3 follows the same growth we observe in MARKAL-CHRES. Finally, we
also define the growth of the technical progress in the private transport energy nest and
7
of the general technical progress on the use of fossil fuels to 1.25% in order to have the
total CO2 emissions baseline decline by 13% between 2000 and 2035 as forecasted by Swiss
Federal Office of Energy (2007).
With regard to total GHG emissions, our baseline scenario is in the average of studies
published since the SRES (IPCC, 2007). The world GHG emissions reache approximately
72 GtCO2eq in 2050, which is also in line with the baseline emissions anticipated in OECD
(2008). Our baseline assumes a great diversity in the regional evolution of GHG emissions
(see figure 4). CHE and JAP emissions reduce by 24% in 2050 compared to 2001 levels. EUR
and OEC see an increase in emissions of 9% and 21% whereas OEU and DCS have higher
baseline emission growths and reach by 2050 113%, respectively 212%, of 2001 emission.
2.4 Coupling
Post-2012 policies should aim at strong abatement targets which could hopefully ensure a
sustainable solution to the climate change issue. Global CGE models are well suited to
analyze market based solutions to the problem, in particular when trying to globally equate
marginal abatement cost through the implementation of carbon markets or world taxes.
When it comes to strong domestic abatement efforts, which will be required in developed
countries before the end of the century, CGE models do not precisely depict all technological
option and therefore all abatement possibilities. In Switzerland, for instance, the residential
sector accounts for a an important share of the total GHG emissions and seems to allow for
important abatement possibilities at reasonable costs (see Sceia et al. (2008)). In general,
coupling top-down with bottom-up models allows to benefit from the technological richness
of the later without loosing the global economic picture (Bo¨hringer, 1998; Bo¨hringer and
Rutherford, 2008). Therefore, in order to analyze thoroughly future Swiss climate policies
within a global framework, we couple a CGE model, GEMINI-E3, with a Swiss residential
energy model, MARKAL-CHRES.
2.4.1 Coupling method
We have further developed the coupling module that links GEMINI-E3 and MARKAL-
CHRES. The coupling module researches the Swiss GHG tax in 2050 that allows to meet
the policy objectives while ensuring that the energy use and the investments in the residential
energy models is adequately taken into account in GEMINI-E3. The coupling method that
we have implemented allows for setting simultaneously total and domestic emission targets
for Switzerland as well as emissions certificates endowments in all regions. We consider that
domestic targets have to be achieved by actual emissions reductions within the country,
whereas total emissions target account for both domestic emissions and net trade of GHG
certificates. In line with these definitions, when no domestic target is defined, the coupling
procedures set a Swiss tax at a level that ensures that the tax revenue allows for purchasing
enough certificates on the global carbon market in order to achieve the total emission target.
If both domestic and total targets are defined, the coupling procedure ensures that the tax
allows for achieving at least the domestic target and ensures that the tax revenue is sufficient
to purchase enough emissions certificates to meet the total emissions target. In all cases,
when the tax revenue exceeds the amount required to purchase the certificates, the difference
is returned to households through a lump sum transfer.
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Figure 2 presents the coupling schema. The GHG progressive tax vector, defined by the
value of the tax in 2050, is the variable that allows to control both models. The residential
fuel mix and the annualized investments over the whole time frame are the coupling variable
ensuring that GEMINI-E3 calculates emissions and adjusts the residential investments in
GEMINI-E3 on the basis of the MARKAL-CHRES simulations. The fuel shares are used as a
proxy for the variation of the share parameters in the residential energy nest, which elasticity
(σhrese) is set to 0, whereas the variation of the total fuel consumption and the variation of
annualized investments are used, respectively, to update the values of the technical progress
on energy and on construction in the residential nest, which is also transformed into a
Leontief function (σhres = 0). Furthermore, total Swiss emissions and world price of GHG
certificates in 2050 are the variables used for ensuring that the coupled models converge
to the targets defined in the scenarios. Finally, the international policy scenarios are set
exogenously, i.e. defining emissions certificates endowments.
GEMINI-E3 MARKAL-CHRESSwiss domestic
POLICY
OPTIMISATION
CONTROL VARIABLES
COUPLING PROCEDURE
Residential fuel mix
Swiss tax
Swiss emissions
COUPLING VARIABLES
Residential investments
Int. emissions targets
EXOGENOUS VAR.
and certificates endowments
GHG certificates world price
and total emissions target
Figure 2: Coupling structure
A technical description of the coupling procedure is provided in algorithms 1 and 2 (see
appendix A).
3 Policy scenarios
Climate change is a global issue which will only be solved through appropriate international
agreements (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993, 1998). It is also a complex issue in which envi-
ronmental concerns interact with the economic, equity and development issues. Considering
the later, the incentive to free ride can be high for some developing countries but it remains
the responsibility of wealthier nations to take the lead and show the example. How much
would it cost for Switzerland to take that leading role and to implement policies that might
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go beyond what international agreements target for the next commitment period?
3.1 International scenarios
In order to set a realistic international framework, we have defined 3 scenarios for inter-
national policies. We decided, following previous studies (e.g. Sceia et al. (2008); Vuuren
et al. (2006)), to focus on policies targeting abatement of all GHG because this allows to
lower abatement costs. Table 1 presents the different GHG emissions quotas in 2050 for
all regions, with the exception of those from Switzerland which will be explained in details
below. These emissions targets are implemented progressively from 2008 to 2050 for EUR
and JAP, from 2012 to 2050 for OEC and OEU and from 2030 to 2050 for DCS. These emis-
sion targets are based on 2001 emissions levels except from those of DCS which are based
on their 2030 baseline emissions. We assume that each region receives annually emissions
certificates at the level of its annual target and is then free to trade them within the region
as well as with other regions. The “high” scenario is inspired by the recommendations of the
Energy Modeling Forum 22 (EMF, 2008) and adapted to the specific regional aggregation
that we use in the model. The “mid” and “low”scenario consider alternatives where climate
negotiations would lead to lower emission targets, in particular from the DCS.
Table 1: International emissions targets in 2050 (% of 2001 emissions)
Scenario Low Mid High
EUR 50 50 50
OEU 10 20 30
JAP 50 50 50
OEC 30 40 50
DCSa -b 0 25
a % of 2030 emissions
b baseline emissions
3.2 Swiss scenarios
In the long run, in order to avoid major climate change, each and every country will have
to reduce its domestic emissions. From an equalitarian perspective, global emission will
certainly have to be shared on a per capita basis. Taking this into account and considering
population forecasts, purchasing emissions certificates does not help industrialized countries
preparing to an inevitable change in their production and consumption patterns. With that
in mind, we consider two kinds of emissions targets for Switzerland. The first is a domestic
emission target that can only be achieved by actual domestic emissions reductions either
in the production or in the consumption of goods. The second is a total emission target
that takes into account not only the domestic abatement but also the purchase and sales of
emission certificates.
In Switzerland, we impose a progressive domestic GHG tax, which grows linearly from
2008 onward and reaches it final value in 2050. The tax revenue collected by the application
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of the tax is used to purchase GHG emissions certificates to reach the total emission target
and the leftover, if any, is redistributed to households through a lump sum transfer. Figure 3
shows the case where no minimal domestic emissions target is set and where the tax is set
to allow for the purchase of GHG emissions certificates abroad ensuring a total abatement
of 50%. The area ABCD represents the tax revenue and the area GBEF the purchase of
certificates at a price pW . The level of the tax is therefore set to equalize areas ABCD
and GBEF, ensuring that the revenue collected is sufficient to purchase the GHG emission
certificates.
Figure 3: Tax revenue used to purchase GHG certificates, a 50% total abatement
We consider 4 scenarios with different objectives and therefore different total emission
targets.
• First, the “50%” scenario is in line with the targets of most European countries. It
aims at achieving a 50% reduction of emissions by 2050 compared to level of 2001.
• Secondly, the “sustainable” scenario aims at globally sustainable per-capita emissions
of 1 tCO2/cap by 2100. We consider, as simplifying assumption and to be in line with
the time horizon of the model, that this translates in a 2 tCO2/cap target by 2050.
Considering that the population of Switzerland in 2050 is estimated at approximately
7 millions inhabitants, the emissions reduction should be of approximately 75% when
compared to 2001 levels.
• Thirdly, the “neutral” scenario, which follows the climate neutrality idea, aims at a
100% reduction of GHG emissions.
• Fourthly, the “zero footprint” scenario takes into account the net emissions embedded
in Swiss foreign trade. The net embedded emissions, mainly due to energy imports,
represent almost 80% of total domestic emission (Jungbluth et al., 2007). Thus, this
scenario aims at offsetting not only the domestic emissions but also those generated
abroad to produce goods imported in Switzerland less the Swiss emissions resulting
from the production of exported goods. With the simplifying hypothesis that that the
embedded emissions remain constant, we consider that the abatement should reach
180% of 2001 emissions.
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In all four scenarios, we set the Swiss tax such as the revenue of the tax is sufficient to
purchase the emissions certificates required to offset the Swiss emissions up to the defined
target.
Considering that Swiss marginal abatement costs are currently high when compared to
world average, the implementation of the previous scenarios might not trigger important
domestic abatement in the short run. In order to prepare the Swiss economy for future
stringent emission reductions, a domestic reductions should be ensured in the forthcoming
commitment period. With that in mind, we consider four additional scenarios similar to
those described above but with the additional requirement of having a minimum domestic
abatement of 50% compared to the emissions of 2001. We name those scenarios “50%+”,
“sustainable+”, “neutral+” and “zero footprint+”.
4 Results
In this section, we describe and compare the results of the simulation carried out for all
the scenarios described earlier. We compare their environmental effectiveness and present
their consequences on the economy, in particular on welfare. First, we focus on the different
implications of the international scenarios, then on the impacts of all scenarios on the Swiss
economy and finally we analyze the contribution of the Swiss residential sector to the overall
abatement effort and the evolution of the sector from a technical perspective.
4.1 International framework
The three international scenarios we have defined have significantly different environmental
and economic implications. From the perspective of GHG emission, in the “low” scenario,
world emissions are still more than 80% higher than in 2001. In the “mid” scenario, the
increase of emissions is reduced to 30%, whereas the“high” scenario caps the GHG emissions
at 34 GtCO2eq, only 2% higher than 2001 levels. Figure 4 presents the regional emissions
profiles for the three scenarios. In all scenarios, DCS is the main provider of emissions
certificates. The abundance of certificates in the first two scenarios, where DCS quotas are
attributed according to the baseline emissions or stabilizing at 2030 levels, ensures a low price
for CO2. Nevertheless, in the “high” scenario, where DCS have to reduce their emissions as
off 2030, the supply of certificates is significantly reduced and the price increases to almost
300 USD2001/tCO2eq. It is important to notice that, if we compare the emissions paths
with the different IPCC scenarios (IPCC, 2007), even our “high” scenarios is not sufficiently
restrictive to ensure a stabilization of GHG limiting the temperature increase to 2◦C.
In order to asses the impact of the three scenario on the world economy, table 2 presents
an aggregated welfare decomposition for the period 2008-2050. The welfare, i.e. the con-
sumer surplus calculated on the basis of the CVI, is decomposed in its three components:
the gains and losses of the terms of trade (GTT), the net receipt from permit sales and the
deadweight loss of taxation. The values in the table represents the sum of the discounted
values as a percentage of the sum of the discounted households final consumption. The
discount rate is set at 5% but increasing or lowering it does not significantly affect the
results.
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Table 2: Welfare decomposition (in % of final households consumption)a
Scenarios Region WGb GTTc ECd DWLe
Low OEU -0.28 0.16 -0.28 -0.16
JAP -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
EUR -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
OEC -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
PVD 0.13 0.07 0.08 -0.02
World 0.00 - - 0.00
Mid OEU -0.28 0.36 -0.65 -0.58
JAP -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
EUR -0.24 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07
OEC -0.22 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04
PVD 0.25 0.17 0.21 -0.13
World -0.04 - - -0.04
High OEU -3.77 -0.19 -1.31 -2.27
JAP -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05
EUR -0.45 -0.05 -0.28 -0.13
OEC -0.52 -0.15 -0.22 -0.15
PVD 0.41 0.28 0.53 -0.41
World -0.23 - - -0.23
a Sum of discounted values as % of the sum of dis-
counted final households consumption (2008-2050)
- 5% discount rate
b Total welfare
c Gains and losses of the terms of trade
d Net revenue from the trade of GHG certificates
e Deadweight loss
13
5000
6000
EUR
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
OEU
0
500
1000
1500
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
JAP
10000
12000
OEC
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
DCS
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
2001 2008 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050
World
Baseline
Total?? Low
Total?? Mid
Total? High
Domestic?? Low
Domestic?? Mid
Domestic?? High
Figure 4: International GHG emissions (MtCO2eq)
As in other studies (see OECD (2008)), we observe that OEU is the region most affected
by climate policies. This is due to the fact that the main exports of this region are energy
or energy related but also to the strong efforts they have to undertake in view of their high
baseline emissions. Furthermore, they tend to have domestic oil prices below international
levels, a framework favoring energy intensive industries, and are therefore more affected in
a carbon-constrained world. In the three scenarios, DCS are the main beneficiaries in terms
of consumer surplus. This is due to the revenue of the sales of certificates as well as the
gains in the terms of trade. When looking at the deadweight loss of taxation, we realize
that DCS are actually also affected, in particular in the high scenario. Concerning the other
regions, JAP has limited losses in both consumer surplus and deadweight loss because in
the baseline their emissions already reduced by almost 25%; a consequence of a slow GDP
growth. EUR and OEC face similar impacts on total welfare with losses ranging from of
0.01% of aggregated total households consumption in the “low” scenario to 0.15% in the
“high” scenario. In view of these results, it appears that even the “high” scenarios would be
achievable at reasonable costs. We compare these results with those from Switzerland here
after.
4.2 Swiss economy
Table 3 shows the key results for Switzerland in each scenario. In the international “high”
scenario, the “sustainable”, “neutral” and “zero-footprint” already achieve the 50% domestic
abatement prescribed in their equivalent “+” scenarios. As a consequence, the results of the
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“sustainable+”, “neutral+” and “zero-footprint+” are identical to the non-“+” scenario and
therefore not presented in the table.
Table 3: Summary results for Switzerland
Scenarios Abatement in 2050a Swiss GHG 2008-2050d
World Switzerland Domestic Total taxb pricec WG GTT EC DWL
Low 50% -28 -50 1.2 3.8 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
sustainable -28 -75 2.5 3.8 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
neutral -28 -100 3.8 3.8 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02
zero-footprint -29 -180 8.2 3.9 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.02
50%+ -50 -50 102.4 3.8 0.21 0.29 0.00 -0.08
sustainable+ -50 -75 102.4 3.8 0.20 0.28 -0.01 -0.08
neutral+ -50 -100 102.4 3.8 0.19 0.28 -0.01 -0.08
zero-footprint+ -50 -180 102.4 3.8 0.17 0.27 -0.04 -0.07
Mid 50% -31 -50 9.7 34.6 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
sustainable -33 -75 21.7 34.7 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.00
neutral -40 -100 34.8 34.8 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.00
zero-footprint -50 -180 90.6 35.1 0.06 0.20 -0.11 -0.03
50%+ -50 -50 102.4 34.6 0.18 0.26 0.00 -0.08
sustainable+ -50 -75 102.1 34.7 0.16 0.25 -0.02 -0.07
neutral+ -50 -100 101.9 34.7 0.14 0.24 -0.04 -0.06
zero-footprint+ -50 -180 101.4 35.1 0.06 0.21 -0.11 -0.04
High 50% -40 -50 50.7 289.2 0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.01
sustainable -50 -75 143.7 289.8 0.12 0.30 -0.06 -0.12
neutral -54 -100 290.7 290.6 0.08 0.42 -0.13 -0.21
zero-footprint -63 -180 926.5 293.6 -0.25 0.88 -0.37 -0.75
50%+ -50 -50 149.2 288.8 0.20 0.34 0.02 -0.15
a % of 2001 emissions
b Swiss tax in 2050 [USD2001/tCO2eq]
c World price of certificates in 2050 [USD2001/tCO2eq]
d Sum of discounted values as % of the sum of discounted final households consumption (2008-2050) - 5%
discount rate
The results from Table 3 show that, in general, international climate policies have a
strong influence on the effect of domestic GHG taxes. In the “low” and “mid” scenario,
regardless of the implemented Swiss policy, the DWL caused by the climate policy is not
larger than 0.08%. These costs are similar to those of other developed regions despite the
fact that they face lower abatement targets. The exceptional case of OEU should be kept
in mind and not compared with the other developed countries in view of the sensitivity of
their economies to climate policies. In the high scenario, as it may be expected, there are
stronger welfare effects. For instance, in the “zero footprint” scenario the DWL is 0.75% -
not surprisingly as the level of domestic GHG tax in 2050 exceeds 900 USD2001/tCO2eq.
Despite of the increasing dead weight losses, total welfare effects tend to remain positive. The
positive levels of households’ surplus are mainly due to the fact that GTT offset the adverse
effects of the DWL. This counter-intuitive result, already mentioned in previous studies (see,
for instance, Babiker et al. (2004); Bernard et al. (2005); Goulder (1995)), can be explained
by several factors. First, we know that for energy importing countries like Switzerland4,
the implementation of CO2 abatement, induces a gain of terms of trade coming from the
decrease of fossil fuels consumption (Bernard et al., 2005). Secondly, the implementation
of international emission trading has ambiguous effects on welfare given its interaction with
4100% of fossil fuels used in Switzerland are imported
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the terms of trade (Babiker et al., 2004). Thirdly, pre-existing distortions modify the results
that could be expected in a first best setting (Goulder, 1995) and this is why CGE models
that take into account existing taxes are so useful under these circumstances.
Our results suggest that the options proposed for a future Swiss climate policy are likely
to have modest economic impacts - considering that there are no restrictions for minimum
levels of domestic abatement. For instance, regardless of the international scenario, when
targeting a 50% abatement level (for 2050) and allowing for the purchase of GHG certificates,
Switzerland’s welfare is less affected than in other regions (e.g. a 0.05% welfare loss in the
mid scenario against 0.08% suffered by Japan). This is mainly due to the fact that, similarly
as in Japan, the Swiss emission baseline achieves a significant part of the abatement at
no additional costs for the policies analyzed here - as it takes into account the current
climate policies. Moreover, Switzerland has a limited impact on the global price of GHG
emissions certificates and has technological options to reduce GHG in the residential sector.
Consequently, it is more inclined to devise climate policies going beyond the agreements
discussed in international fora. Furthermore, the welfare costs supported by Switzerland
seem reasonable even for the more ambitious policies. In most scenarios, without taking
developing countries into consideration, Switzerland is better off than other regions. Only
in the “zero footprint” and “zero footprint+” scenarios, Japan has less welfare losses than
Switzerland under some of the international abatement schemes.
We further observe that when there is mandatory minimum level of domestic abate-
ment, the economic impacts of the climate policies analyzed are favorable for Switzerland.
There are welfare gains for all policies but the “zero footprint+”. For instance, achieving a
50% reduction of domestic emissions in an international environment aiming at moderate
abatement (i.e. the “low” and “mid” scenarios), would require a GHG tax of approximately
102 USD/tCO2eq. Despite the fact that this tax may seem important when compared to a
tax that allows for collecting sufficient money to purchase certificates to achieve the same
target, i.e. 1.2 USD/tCO2eq, the gains in the terms of trade allow for a higher total welfare
- as we have explained above.
The effects of the policies on the Swiss economy are more noticeable when we consider
the high world scenario. The largest welfare loss is of 0.25% for the “zero footprint+”
scenario - whether or not there is a restriction for domestic abatement. Furthermore, if
international targets are more stringent, as it is the case in the “high” scenario, the tax that
allows reducing domestically 50% of the emissions should reaches almost 150 USD/tCO2eq.
This 50% increase in the level of the tax, compared to the “low” and “mid” scenarios, is due
to the strong decrease in energy demand worldwide which leads to an important reduction
of energy prices. An increase in the GHG tax is therefore necessary in order to achieve the
same abatement. Interestingly, when aiming at a 75% reduction, the domestic abatement is
also of 50% but, due to a large transfer of capitals caused by the purchase of expensive GHG
certificates, the economy contracts sufficiently to allow for a lower tax, i.e. 143 USD/tCO2eq,
to achieve the same domestic target. Figure 5 schematically represents the effect of a
translation of the MAC curve due to the reduced economic activity. The areas BCEF and
HCDG represent respectively the tax revenues and the purchase of certificates in value.
The figure shows that the tax allowing for 50% of abatement can be higher than tax (tax′)
which revenue is used to purchase GHG certificates to reach a 75% total abatement due to
the reduction of the activity. Both taxes achieve a domestic 50% abatement, crossing their
respective MAC curves in points A and B. The same effect, but at a lower scale, can also be
observed in the results of the “mid” scenario where the taxes allowing for a 50% domestic
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abatement decrease when the total abatement requirements increase.
Figure 5: Translation of the MAC curve due to activity reduction
On the production side, there are no surprises for the two energy sectors active in Switzer-
land. On the one hand, Figure 6 shows that, in all scenarios, the “Petroleum products”
sector, which is rather limited in size in Switzerland, is the major looser since its products
are directly taxed. On the other and, the “electricity” sector benefits from the fact that the
Swiss energy production is mainly produced from nuclear and hydro. It is important to note
that the model assumes a continuity in the current electricity production patterns. Con-
sequently, these results would change significantly if we would assume that nuclear power
plants would be replaced by gas turbines.
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Figure 6: Sectoral production change due to the policy scenarios
The impact on the remaining sectors varies. Even strong climate policies have little
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impact on the “services” sector. Regarding road and rail transport (transport nec), the
sector is not strongly affected even in the “high” scenario. In 2050, for those scenarios where
the Swiss tax is inferior to the world price of certificates, the reduction of the demand for
fossil fuels world wide drive the price down with directly benefits the sector in Switzerland.
For the “neutral” scenario, in which the Swiss tax equals the price of certificates in 2050, the
transport sector face an increase in energy prices of approximately 70% but nevertheless,
in view of the low substitutability of transport to other inputs5, the impact of the tax
is low. If rail and road transport would have been separated sectors, we would certainly
have witnessed a switch from road to rail, which, in Switzerland, uses almost exclusively
electricity produced without fossil fuels.
The difference between the production patterns in 2030 and 2050 are explained by the
non linear variation the price of the GHG certificates. Domestically, the GHG tax is defined
as growing linearly from 2008 to 2050. Nevertheless, when it comes to the total emissions
target, the price of certificates in highly influenced by the participation of DCS to the global
abatement effort. In the “mid” and “high” scenarios, the price of GHG certificates starts to
grow rapidly only as of 2030, when DCS start having a constraint on their emission. Figure7
show the difference in prices between the Swiss tax and the international price of certificates,
in the “high-neutral” and “high-50%” scenarios. Therefore, the more GHG certificates need
to be purchased, the more important are the transfers of money, which drive down the
exchange rate, penalizing import and favoring exports.
As a consequence, some sectors come out surprisingly well in 2050, in particular in those
scenarios where the price of GHG certificates is high. Among those, the “agriculture” and
“chemical, rubber and plastic” sectors, two sectors know for their dependance on products
derived from oil or oil itself, benefit from major changes in the trade patterns. In the
“high - neutral” neutral scenario, the “chemical, rubber and plastic” sector sees an increase
of exports overcoming the increase in imports and the agricultural imports drop almost
30%, thus stimulating the domestic production. Similarly, the Swiss “Mineral products” and
“Metal and metal products” sectors also benefit strongly from the decrease in imports.
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Figure 7: Swiss tax vs international price of certificates [UDS2001/CO2eq]
5the elasticity is set to 0.2
18
4.3 Swiss residential sector
4.3.1 Emissions
Figure 8 shows to what extent the residential sector can contribute to the abatement, by
presenting how the emissions for the residential sector and from the rest of the economy
evolve over time, as well as which part of the abatement is undertaken by the residential
sector. The dashed lines show the targets of the total emissions. The MARKAL-CHRES,
through its explicit modeling of technological options, shows that, without having to im-
plement “backstop” technologies, a strong and natural switch to cleaner technologies takes
place in case of high taxes. In order to avoid high costs in the future, households invest in
cleaner technologies rapidly. The residential sector starts contributing significantly to the
overall abatement when the GHG tax reaches around 30 USD/tCO2eq (Mid - Neutral), and
does the major part of it when the tax gets close to 100 USD/tCO2eq (Low - 50%+)
6. In
the high scenarios, the residential sector stops emitting CO2 as early as 2030, switching to
technologies using electricity instead of fossil fuels.
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Figure 8: Contribution to the abatement of the residential sector (MtCO2eq)
6We suspect that the private transportation, if modeled similarly to the residential sector, could provide
additional abatement opportunities and, therefore, reduce the value of the tax
19
4.3.2 Energy consumption and technologies
For the evaluation of energy consumption and technologies we concentrate on the residential
sector as a whole and more specifically on the residential heating sub-sector, which in 2000
accounted by far for the largest share of residential energy consumption. At the same time
the residential heating sub-sector appears to offer substantial demand reduction possibilities
in terms of available technological options and energy saving measures.
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Figure 9: Fuel consumption in the residential sector
All scenarios examined here project a reduction, or at least a stabilization in residential
fuel consumption from levels in 2000. For instance, according to IEA Statistics, residential
energy consumption amounted to 234.6 PJ in 2000, while the highest observed value of all
scenarios is 224.4 PJ in 2020 and 221.4 PJ in 2050. A similar trend is observed in the
residential heating sub-sector, where even in the scenarios with the low emission reduction
targets, energy consumption stabilizes around its year 2000 value of 165 PJ. Considering
increases in residential floor area over the next 40 to 50 years, already this observation
indicates that substantial improvements are likely to arise without stringent climate pol-
icy, even though further reductions in consumption are attainable when appropriate policy
measures are implemented. However, these results also show that implementation of mild
(low) world-wide emission targets does not achieve significant reductions in domestic fuel
consumption when Switzerland is able to meet its emission reduction commitments through
the purchase of tradable certificates. In this case, technological change is moderate, with
technologies similar to the existing ones and that have slightly higher efficiencies but still
consume the same type of fuel. Examples of these technologies include oil and natural gas
room heating or combined room and water heating systems.
When low world-wide emissions targets are combined with a requirement to achieve
emission reductions with domestic measures, we observe a significant impact on the Swiss
residential sector. This impact is twofold. On the one hand such regulations reduce the
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Table 4: Fuel consumption and energy savings for residential heating in PJ
Scenarios All fuelsa Energy Savingsb
World Switzerland 2020 2050 2020 2050
Low 50% 164.7 168.6 9.5 15.9
sustainable 164.7 168.4 9.5 16.1
neutral 164.7 167.9 9.5 16.3
zero-footprint 164.4 165.2 9.8 17.1
50%+ 146.6 76.8 10.9 19.9
sustainable+ 146.6 76.8 10.9 19.9
neutral+ 146.6 76.8 10.9 19.9
zero-footprint+ 146.6 78.1 10.9 19.9
Mid 50% 164.4 160.7 9.8 17.1
sustainable 163.8 154.3 10.4 18.1
neutral 161.8 119.1 10.4 18.8
zero-footprint 148.4 79.6 10.9 19.8
50%+ 146.6 78.1 10.9 19.9
sustainable+ 146.6 78.1 10.9 19.9
neutral+ 147.3 78.5 10.9 19.9
zero-footprint+ 147.9 79.0 10.9 19.9
High 50% 158.1 96.2 10.6 19.0
sustainable 137.0 67.3 11.1 20.2
neutral 131.0 65.2 11.3 20.9
zero-footprint 95.7 57.9 13.4 23.5
50%+ 137.0 67.3 11.0 20.1
a Total energy used
b Useful energy saved
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overall energy consumption. By 2020, residential energy consumption declines to 206 PJ
and reduces further to about 130 PJ in 2050. A large share of this reduction occurs in the
residential heating sub-sector, where energy consumption halves to about 78 PJ (relative to
2000 levels). On the other hand such regulations trigger fuel switching on a large scale. The
consumption of fossil fuel reduces drastically to around 20 to 25 PJ in 2050, compared to
around 160 PJ in the scenarios where Switzerland is able to meet its obligations through the
purchase of certificates. This coincides with an increase in the consumption of electricity
to more than 100 PJ. In the residential sector this change is triggered by switching from
fossil heating installations to heat pumps in single and multi-family houses. New houses are
constructed with heat pump and pellet heating installations. It is also worth reiterating that
the residential sector still uses fossil fuels in all of the low scenarios. Although a minimum
domestic abatement of 50% is required in Switzerland, the additional reductions required in
the scenarios neutral+ and zero-footprint+ are achieved by purchasing emission certificates.
Only when high (stringent) world-wide emission targets are combined with strong do-
mestic emission targets (corresponding to the neutral and zero-footprint scenarios), does the
Swiss residential sector shift completely away from fossil fuels. Instead of purchasing emis-
sion certificates, additional electricity heat pumps are installed in single and multi-family
houses to satisfy the heating demand, which due to their high efficiency lowers the final en-
ergy consumption. Additionally, by supporting and implementing enhanced energy-saving
standards (i.e., improved insulation), the energy demand (useful energy) can be reduced by
up to 23.4 PJ per year. Hence, high performance energy saving technologies contribute to
a large share of the reduction in energy consumption. For example, better insulation of the
housing stock, such as by using a double or triple-glazed window insulation with a thermal
transmission coefficient of 1 W/m2k or less, is important in these scenarios. In addition to
these energy saving options, expensive biomass and other renewable technologies (mainly
pellet heating but also combined solar systems) also penetrate the domestic market to reduce
emissions further.
This analysis of high emission targets indicates that the maximum energy reduction
potential amounts to slightly more than 50% in the residential sector (compared to 2000
levels), for the set of technologies included. In the residential heating sub-sector, the energy
reduction potential (combining energy saving and efficient heating technology) amounts to
two-thirds of the energy consumed in the year 2000.
5 Conclusions
According to the results presented in this paper, Switzerland has the potential and the means
to extend its climate policy beyond the 50% target currently under discussion for 2050. It
could afford, independently of climate policies in other parts other parts of the world, to
achieve a target of 2tCO2eq/cap while ensuring at least 50% domestic abatement through
the implementation of a domestic progressive GHG tax reaching 144 UDS/tCO2eq in 2050.
At first glance, ensuring domestic abatement through the implementation of a domestic
tax may seem unreasonably expensive because of the current prices of CO2. Nevertheless,
our simulations show that through gains in the terms of trade, Switzerland would actually
benefit in terms of total welfare from setting targets to domestic GHG emissions. Those
gains would obviously be reduced when global emissions targets become tighter because an
increased cost in the purchase of certificates. The tax would even have to be increased in
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case that the world target would go beyond our high scenario due to the drop in fossil energy
prices that would follow the reduction in the demand.
When looking at the investments made in the residential sector, we can see that when
economic agent have the certainty that fossil fuels will become more expensive in the fu-
ture, they invest strategically and very rapidly in order to avoid excessive costs. Important
technology options in this context include energy saving technologies (such as improved in-
sulation), and efficient electric heat pumps, which reduce energy demand and facilitate a
shift away from fossil fuels. In addition, for more stringent policies, biomass and renewables
play an additional role. Regardless of this, this study shows that the technological alterna-
tives to replace the fossil fuels in the residential sector exist, and those technologies become
profitable when GHG taxes are implemented. Using our coupling procedure for other parts
of the economy, e.g. private transportation, commercial buildings and industry, would bring
additional technological option which are not taken into account in this study. Including
further options is likely to provide additional flexibility in reducing emissions, thereby reduc-
ing abatement costs. In the framework of the coupling, the energy model somehow provides
a similar feature as the implementation of an arbitrary backstop technology, but with a
realistic technological description. This provides additional insights by identifying specific
technologies and enhances the overall modeling framework. In our case, we see heat pumps
being largely installed because of their high energy efficiency.
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A Coupling algorithms
The algorithms below use the the following nomenclature:
e¯ Total target on Swiss emissions
e¯d Minimal target on Swiss domestic emissions
tmin Minimum value of the Swiss GHG tax
tmax Maximum value of the Swiss GHG tax
fm fuel mix
ai Annualized investments
M() run of MARKAL-CHRES
e Swiss GHG emissions
target Variable indicating which of the domestic or total target is binding
pW World price of GHG certificates
G() run of GEMINI-E3
critd Swiss domestic criteria
crit Swiss total criteria
criteria Overall criteria
tax Swiss GHG tax
∆tax Variation of the tax between two iterations
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Algorithm 1: GMC-1.8 Coupling procedure without minimum domestic target
Input: Total target on Swiss emissions e¯
Output: Swiss tax tax
tmin = 0; tmax = 100;
(fm, ai) =M(tmax);
(e, pW ) = G(tmax, fm, ai);
crit = e− e · tmax/pW − e¯;
while crit > 0 do
tmin = tmax; tmax = tmax + 100;
(fm, ai) =M(tmax);
(e, pW ) = G(tmax, fm, ai);
crit = e− e · tmax/pW − e¯;
end
tax = tmin + (tmax − tmin)/2;
while |crit| > 0.01 and |∆tax| > 0.001 do
(fm, ai) =M(tax);
(e, pW ) = G(tax, fm, ai);
crit = e− e · tax/pW − e¯;
if crit < 0 then
tmax = tax
else
tmin = tax
end
tax = tmin + (tmax − tmin)/2;
end
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Algorithm 2: GMC-1.8 - Coupling procedure with minimum domestic target e¯d
Input: Total target on Swiss emissions e¯, Minimal target on Swiss domestic
emissions e¯d
Output: Swiss tax tax
target = 0; tmin = 0; tmax = 100;
(fm, ai) =M(tmax);
(e, pW ) = G(tmax, fm, ai);
critd = e− e¯d; crit = e− e · tmax/pW − e¯;
while critd > 0 or crit > 0 do
tmin = tmax; tmax = tmax + 100;
(fm, ai) =M(tmax);
(e, pW ) = G(tmax, fm, ai);
critd = e− e¯d;
crit = e− e · tmax/pW − e¯;
if critd ≤ 0 and crit > 0 then
target = t; criteria = e− rev/pW − e¯;
else if critd > 0 and crit ≤ 0 then
target = d; criteria = e− e¯d;
end
end
tax = tmin + (tmax − tmin)/2;
while target = 0 do
(fm, ai) =M(tax);
(e, pW ) = G(tax, fm, ai);
critd = e− e¯d;
crit = e− e · tax/pW − e¯;
if crit < 0 then tmax = tax else tmin = tax;
tax = tmin + (tmax − tmin)/2;
if critd ≤ 0 and crit > 0 then
target = t; criteria = e− rev/pW − e¯;
else if critd > 0 and crit ≤ 0 then
target = d; criteria = e− e¯d;
end
end
while |criteria| > 0.01 and |∆tax| > 0.001 do
(fm, ai) =M(tax);
(e, pW ) = G(tax, fm, ai);
if target = t then
criteria = e− e · tax/pW − e¯;
else
criteria = e− e¯d;
end
if criteria < 0 then tmax = tax else tmin = tax;
tax = tmin + (tmax − tmin)/2;
end
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B Details on characteristics of the models
Table 5: Dimensions of the complete GEMINI-E3 Model
Countries or Regions Sectors/Products
Annex B Energy
Germany DEU 01 Coal
France FRA 02 Crude Oil
United Kingdom GBR 03 Natural Gas
Italy ITA 04 Refined Petroleum
Spain ESP 05 Electricity
Netherlands NLD Non-Energy
Belgium BEL 06 Agriculture
Poland POL 07 Forestry
Rest of EU-25 OEU 08 Mineral Products
Switzerland CHE 09 Chemical Rubber Plastic
Other European Countries XEU 10 Metal and metal products
United States of America USA 11 Paper Products Publishing
Canada CAN 12 Transport n.e.c.
Australia and New Zealand AUZ 13 Sea Transport
Japan JAP 14 Air Transport
Russia RUS 15 Consuming goods
Rest of Former Soviet Union XSU 16 Equipment goods
Non-Annex B 17 Services
China CHI 18 Dwellings
Brazil BRA
India IND Household Sector
Mexico MEX
Venezuela VEN Primary Factors
Rest of Latin America LAT Labor
Turkey TUR Capital
Rest of Asia ASI Energy
Middle East MID Fixed factor (sector 01-03)
Tunisia TUN Other inputs
Rest of Africa AFR
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Table 6: MARKAL-CHRES Demand segments
RC1 Cooling
RCD Cloth Drying
RCW Cloth Washing
RDW Dish Washing
REA Other Electric
RH1 Room-Heating Single-Family Houses (SFH) existing building
RH2 Room-Heating SFH new building
RH3 Room-Heating Multi-Family Houses (MFH) existing buildings
RH4 Room-Heating MFH new buildings
RHW Hot Water
RK1 Cooking
RL1 Lighting
RRF Refrigeration
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